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Abstract. Understanding political phenomena requires measuring the
political preferences of society. We introduce a model based on mixtures
of spatial voting models that infers the underlying distribution of polit-
ical preferences of voters with only voting records of the population and
political positions of candidates in an election. Beyond offering a cost-
effective alternative to surveys, this method projects the political pref-
erences of voters and candidates into a shared latent preference space.
This projection allows us to directly compare the preferences of the two
groups, which is desirable for political science but difficult with tradi-
tional survey methods. After validating the aggregated-level inferences
of this model against results of related work and on simple prediction
tasks, we apply the model to better understand the phenomenon of polit-
ical polarization in the Texas, New York, and Ohio electorates. Taken at
face value, inferences drawn from our model indicate that the electorates
in these states may be less bimodal than the distribution of candidates,
but that the electorates are comparatively more extreme in their vari-
ance. We conclude with a discussion of limitations of our method and
potential future directions for research.
Keywords: probabilistic generative models, political polarization, de-
mographic inference, ideal point models, computational social science
1 Introduction
Within a representative democracy, understanding the extent to which elected
officials represent their constituencies is critical to evaluating the efficiency of
the political system. Here we focus on the political system in the United States,
where surveys typically evaluate the preferences of the electorate. Despite their
widespread use, surveys can be costly, time consuming to execute, and often lack
broad geographical coverage. Fortunately, there is an alternative source of readily
available data about the preferences of the electorate—votes cast in elections.
The key challenge of using voting data to infer localized distributions of polit-
ical preferences is the coarseness of the data. Consider inferring the distribution
of political preferences of voters from votes cast in a two-candidate election.
Since there are only two data points from the election (and a constraint that the
two points sum to the total voting population size), inferring the distribution of
preferences from these vote shares appears underdetermined.
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In this paper, we introduce a model-based machine learning method to mea-
sure the political preferences of voters at a fine level of geographical granular-
ity. To solve the underdetermination problem, we introduce a Bayesian mixture
model that pools data from similar election outcomes of different geographical
voting units (precincts). The method connects the distribution of preferences
within each precinct to voting outcomes using a spatial voting model—a stan-
dard rational voting model from the political science literature [11,12]. Our model
utilizes vote share data and a preprocessed form of campaign finance data to infer
distributions of political preferences with potentially better coverage and lower
cost than traditional survey methods [1,13,14,19,21].
An additional benefit of our method over surveys is that the inferred political
preferences of voters are represented on the same scale as those of candidates.
This is important for social science applications involving the comparison of
politicians and the electorate [5]. To demonstrate the potential utility of our
method and of related future work in this area, we apply our technique to un-
derstand the extent of political polarization in the Texas, New York, and Ohio
electorates in comparison to that of the political candidates. While it is well-
known that elected officials are highly polarized in their political positions, the
political science community has not reached consensus as to whether the pref-
erences of voters mirror this elite polarization or are comparatively moderate
[1,13]. Using congressional election data for the states from the 2006, 2008, and
2010 election cycles, we find varying answers to the question depending on the
polarization metric we use. We find that the distribution of the political pref-
erences of voters is likely more extreme than that of candidates in terms of
variance, while less extreme than that of candidates in terms of bimodality.
In the remainder of this paper, we begin with a discussion of related works.
We then provide an overview of our novel probabilistic generative model of voting
behavior. We validate this model with comparisons to results of related work and
with simple prediction tasks. We then apply our model to better understand
political polarization in Texas, New York, and Ohio. Finally, we conclude with
a discussion of the limitations of this method and suggestions for future work.
1.1 Related Work
There has been recent work in quantitative political science that is closely re-
lated to our work. For instance, researchers recently developed a technique for
estimating the preferences of the electorate and elected officials from Twitter
data using a probabilistic generative network model related to the spatial vot-
ing model we use [5]. Some political scientists have used ideal point models,
which are closely related to spatial voting models, to infer distributions of voter
preferences from fine-grained voter data [22,16]. Unlike our work, these previous
works using voting data relied on individual-level voting data, which is difficult
to obtain. Other political scientists have developed meta-analysis-like methods
for aggregating survey results to improve accuracy and representativeness [27],
but this work still suffers from the limitation of low coverage of survey data due
to collection difficulties. Thus, the methods can only consider a coarser level of
geographical granularity.
Within the computer science field, our work falls closest to a growing line
of research dedicated to developing novel machine learning models for compu-
tational social science. Machine learning researchers in this area have not yet
addressed the exact problem we study in our work, to the best of our knowl-
edge. However, they have been interested in similar problems and related classes
of models (e.g. [17,15,18,2]). More tangentially, a large body of work in computer
science has been dedicated to drawing inferences from public observational data.
Some researchers have suggested using social media data to better understand
public opinion [26], while others have developed models based on inconsistent
user behavior to infer their implicit preferences [10].
2 Model
We first discuss mathematical theories of voting behavior that inform our novel
model. Then, we describe our model for inferring political preferences of voters.
2.1 Spatial Voting Models
Our model generalizes the widely used “spatial” or “Downsian” voting model,
which is a standard model in political science of rational voting and turnout be-
havior in two-candidate majority vote elections [11,12]. The spatial voting model
defines each voter and each political candidate as points in a one-dimensional
policy space. The model defines the utility to a voter of a specific candidate win-
ning as the Euclidean distance between their two points. Assuming the election
involves exactly two candidates, the spatial voting model predicts that voters
will select for their votes the candidates closest to them according to Euclidean
distance in the single-dimensional policy space.
2.2 Mixtures of Spatial Voting Models
Our statistical model consists of a generative process for the vote shares of
candidates in an election. Each precinct i with Ni total voters is associated with
an election of exactly two candidates, c0i and c1i. In line with the spatial voting
model, we assume that voters vji, j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} and candidates cki, k ∈ {0, 1},
have positions in the same one-dimensional latent space, which we consider their
political preferences. We assume the candidate positions are known to all election
participants. Like other spatial voting models, we assume that each voter j of
precinct i votes for the closest candidate in the one-dimensional latent policy
space. In other words, voter j in precinct i votes for candidate 0 in precinct i if
|vji − c0i| < |vji − c1i|.
We assume that each precinct is associated with a particular distribution
over political preferences, which determines the preferences of the voters in that
precinct. However, it is problematic to assume that these distributions are all
distinct from and independent of each other. In this case we are limited to using
only one data point per precinct to infer a distinct distribution. To solve this issue
we use a mixture model to pool data across precincts. We assume that certain
subsets, or clusters, of precincts share the same distribution of preferences. These
assignment of precincts to clusters is determined dynamically during inference
according to similarity in observed voting patterns. This modeling assumption
seems reasonable given that it is likely neighboring precincts will have similar
distributions of preferences.
The expected proportion of precincts that will be assigned to each of K clus-
ters is given a Dirichlet prior, θ ∼ Dirichlet(1) and |θ| = K. The assignment
of each precinct i to a particular cluster is then drawn as in a standard mix-
ture model, xi ∼ θ. The position of each voter j in each precinct i is drawn
according to a component distribution associated with the cluster assignment of
that precinct. The parameters of these component distributions are given weakly
informative priors. The number of votes nki received by candidate k in precinct
i are then given deterministically by the spatial voting model specified above.
Mathematically, n0i =
∑Ni
j=1 1(|vji − c0i| < |vji − c1i|), where 1 is an indicator
function, and n1i = Ni − n0i.
We treat candidate positions as fixed and given since we have data on these
values, but we treat voter positions, precinct assignments, and cluster distri-
bution parameters as unknown. After marginalizing over voter positions, then
conditioning on direct estimates of candidate positions and on observed vote
shares per candidate, we can use Bayesian inference to arrive at likely values for
the remaining unknown parameters, thus estimating the distributions of voter
preferences within each precinct.
3 Data
For our empirical analysis, we use three main sources of data.
Precinct-Level Voting Results. Precincts are the finest granularity of publicly
accessible aggregated vote shares. We examine congressional elections of Texas,
New York, and Ohio [3]. In these cycles, Republicans won 65% of the Texas
elections, and Democrats won 80% of the New York elections. We also analyze
Ohio to test the ability of our method to generalize to more extreme voter
distributions, as Ohio is commonly labeled by political scientists as a “swing
state”. We consider the election cycles 2006, 2008, and 2010 because they all
depend on the same district geographic boundaries set by the 2000 U.S. Census.
We omit the 2002 and 2004 election cycles to focus on recent elections. Future
work could analyze longer periods.
Candidate CFscores. We incorporate quantitative estimates of the political pref-
erences of candidates called campaign-finance scores (CFscores) [7]. CFscores are
one-dimensional quantitative estimates of the political ideology of political can-
didates, with lower values indicating more liberal ideologies and higher values
more conservative. CFscores are recognized as effective estimates of candidate
ideology when estimates for unelected candidates are needed (in contrast to
DW-NOMINATE scores which only exist for winning candidates [25]).
Geographic Precinct Boundaries. We link the above-mentioned data sets with
the congressional candidates running in each precinct election. We assign any
precincts to the district whose geographic center fall within the specific congres-
sional district boundary lines using the Geospatial Data Abstraction Library
(GDAL/OGR) package [23,28].
4 Inference
The goal of our inference procedure is to determine likely precinct assignments
(x) and likely parameters of the K cluster distributions in the model described
in Sect. 2. These estimates allow us to characterize the distribution of voter
preferences of each precinct.
For more efficient inference, we first integrate out the voter positions (v) and
the precinct assignments (x). All component distributions we consider allow
the voter positions to be integrated out analytically. This yields the following
posterior distribution:
P (η,θ |v) (1)
∝ P (θ)P (η)
∑
x
P (x |θ)
∫
y
P (y |x,η)P (v |η,y) (2)
∝ P (η)
M∏
i=1
[
K∑
xi=1
θxi(Φi,xi)
n0i(1− Φi,xi)n1i
]
(3)
where η is the distribution parameters of each cluster, and Φi,xi is the cumulative
distribution of the component distribution of precinct i after integrating out y, in
other words Φi,xi = P
(
y < c1i−c0i2 | ηxi
)
. For prior distributions over the cluster
parameters, when using Normal component distributions, we use a Normal prior
for µ with a mean of 0 and a variance of 100, and for σ we use an Inverse Gamma
distribution with scale and shape parameters both set to 1.
We then use a Metropolis-Hasting Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm to arrive at likely values for the component distribution parameters
and the mixture proportion (θ)1. To generate the results presented in this paper,
we ran four independent MCMC chains from randomly generated initialized
values. We then selected the set of parameter values from all generated sets that
yield the highest posterior. We infer parameter values separately for the data of
each state and election cycle combination described in Sect. 3. After inferring
the parameters of the mixture distribution, we infer all precinct assignments to
1 Code and data for analyses are available at https://github.com/anahm/
inferring-population-preferences
clusters, x, by selecting the maximum a posteriori (MAP) assignment variable
for each precinct.
Our model-based method provides a better approach than analyzing vote
shares because we can derive an overall distribution of preferences per precinct
rather than a single point. This approach also has benefits even looking at coarser
geographic granularity as well. We ultimately aggregate our inferences to district
or state level for validation purposes, and inferring precinct-level distributions
opens the possibility for the distribution at a less-granular level to be a compli-
cated combination of precinct-level distributions.
5 Validation
To assess validity, we compare summary statistics of the distributions we infer
with corresponding values from related works. In addition, we compare the pre-
dictive performance of our model with prediction methods based on empirical
data and results of related works. In this section, we present results assuming the
number of clusters, K, is 4 and underlying Normal component distributions, but
we reach similar results when we vary the value of K and the component distri-
bution type, which can be seen in Sect. B. These validation methods are meant
to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the “face validity” of our proposed
model.
5.1 Comparison with Related Works
We compare our results with the results of two survey-based methods for es-
timating district-level political preferences. This comparison would ensure that
our inferred distributions are qualitatively reasonable from the perspective of the
prior related work. A district is a coarser granularity geographical unit than a
precinct, but precinct-level surveys are rarely implemented due to high costs. To
compare, we obtain a single-point estimate of each congressional district prefer-
ence in Texas, New York, and Ohio from our inferred precinct-level distributions.
To compute single-point estimates of district-level voter preferences, we use
our model’s assumption that each precinct has the same parameters as the in-
ferred parameters of its assigned cluster. The district-level estimates are averages
of the precinct-level inferences of precincts in the same district weighted by the
population of those precincts.
Comparison with Raw Survey Results. We first compare with the Cooper-
ative Congressional Election Study (CCES) [4]. The CCES surveys over 50,000
Americans every election cycle. Many political scientists use the CCES to un-
derstand the American public opinion. Moreover, the CCES respondents report
their congressional districts, which yields more fine-grained data than most other
national surveys [4]. We compare our results with the survey responses to two
questions. The first question asks:
Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own po-
litical viewpoint? (Very Liberal, Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, Very
Conservative, Not sure)
As shown in Fig. 1, we find a significant positive correlation between our
district-level point estimates and the responses to this question. The correlation
level of the results of our method and reported survey values is 0.3127 with a
p-value less than 0.01.
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Fig. 1. (Left) Inferred district-level voter preferences compared with CCES question of
self-reported ideologies on a discrete scale. (Center) Inferred preferences compared with
CCES self-reported ideologies on a continuous scale from 0 to 100. (Right) District-
level inferences of a decade compared with MRP estimates [27]. In all cases, the inferred
district-level voter preferences are weighted mean district estimates transformed from
x to sign(x) log(|x| + 1).
The second CCES question asks survey respondents to score their political
ideology on a continuous scale. The question is phrased:
One way that people talk about politics in the United States is in terms of
left, right, and center, or liberal, conservative, and moderate. We would
like to know how you view the parties and candidates using these terms.
The scale below represents the ideological spectrum from very liberal (0)
to very conservative (100). The most centrist American is exactly at the
middle (50). Where would you place yourself?
This question was only used in the 2006 and 2008 CCES surveys [4]. As
shown in Fig. 1, we find a significant positive correlation between our estimates
and the responses to this CCES question. The correlation level of the log of the
estimates of our method and reported survey values is 0.2535 with a p-value less
than 0.01. Using a monotonic transformation is acceptable since the answers to
survey questions and our inferred preferences are not necessarily on comparable
scales.
Comparison with Aggregated Survey Results. In addition to CCES re-
sults, we validate our results against district-level ideological scores developed
by two political scientists, Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw. They
use disaggregation and multilevel regression with post-stratification (MRP) on
survey data from 2000 to 2010 to estimate mean policy preferences of congres-
sional districts [27]. Their work is one of the recent related works understanding
preferences, and they analyze election cycles in a similar time frame to this paper
[27]. Further, these ideological scores might be more representative of the U.S.
population because the work’s inference methods account for possible sampling
bias.
One caveat of the work by Tausanovitch and Warshaw is that their estimates
span a decade of voter behavior rather than a single election. To ensure com-
parison across consistent measures, we aggregate the district-level results of our
model across the three election cycles into one district-level estimate spanning
2006-2010. As shown in Fig. 1, we find a significant positive correlation of 0.4149
between the log of the results of our method and their results with a p-value
less than 0.01. By contrast, the MRP compared to the two CCES responses has
correlations of 0.6543 and 0.7189.
The correlations between our results and the results of the survey-based
methods suggest that our method can infer similar qualitative distributions to
those of prior works. Further, our method can not only recover district-level mean
political preferences, but also examine more granularity, precinct-level prefer-
ences in a shorter time period.
5.2 Predictive Power
As a second method of validation, we analyze the predictive power of our model.
Specifically, we derive values from a comparison election to predict the Demo-
cratic vote share of a separate target election. Here a target election is either an
election occurring in a later cycle or for a different government position occurring
in the same cycle.
While prediction tasks are sometimes used to argue that a model has the
best predictive value compared to alternative models, that is not the goal of this
section. We are aware that the predictive power could be improved by incor-
porating more types of data. Rather, the purpose of these prediction tasks is
to demonstrate that our model achieves predictive performance comparable to
reasonable alternatives. Our method has additional benefits in terms over the
comparison methods, so these prediction tasks are meant to lend quantitative
face validity to our model.
Methods of Prediction. We compute the expected vote share of the Demo-
cratic candidate (assigned to be candidate 0) of the target election by assuming
voters follow the spatial voting model and that voter preferences are identical in
the comparison and target elections. The predicted vote share of each precinct i
is given by Φi,xi , the cumulative of the inferred distribution of voter preferences
at the midpoint between the CFscores of the two candidates running in the tar-
get election. We aggregate vote shares of the candidate in all precincts of the
same district to facilitate comparison with less fine-grained data sources.
We compare the predictive power of values yielded by our model with three
alternatives: raw vote shares of previous elections, survey data, and MRP esti-
mates. The method using raw vote shares assumes the candidates of the same
political party receive the same proportion of votes in the comparison and the
target election. For instance, this na¨ıve baseline predicts the vote share of the
Democratic candidate in 2010 is equivalent to the vote share of the Democratic
candidate in the previous election in 2008. We consider this the baseline predic-
tion model.
The survey prediction method uses CCES responses to a question on political
party affiliation as a proxy for votes for the Democratic candidate in the target
election [4]. We approximate the percentage of Democrats as the number of
reported Democrats and half the reported Independent or Other divided by the
total number of responses. We assume the respondents who state Independent
or Other divide equally between Democrat or Republican when faced with only
those options.
We also develop a prediction method based on the MRP estimates developed
by Tausanovitch and Warshaw [27]. This method, labeled in Fig. 2 as MRP
Cross-Val, is a simple cross-validation leave-one-out prediction method using
MRP ideological scores to predict vote share. For the Cross-Val method, we
obtain predictions for each district given the remaining districts and combine
error terms into one mean squared error. The previously described prediction
methods predict all district preferences at once, so the methods only yield one
error term, which is the mean squared error term.
Prediction Tasks. We examine two prediction tasks: next cycle and same-year.
The next cycle prediction task defines target elections as congressional elections
of the same district one election cycle (two years) after the comparison election
cycle. In other words, we use point estimates of voter preferences from election
cycle t− 1 to predict the results of election t.
The second prediction task, the same-year prediction task, defines target
elections as elections for a different government position, a Senate seat, in the
same election cycle as the comparison election. Although our method infers es-
timates using results of the same year as the election we are trying to predict,
the target and comparison elections are for unrelated positions. We assume that
voters consider their votes for different ballot items as in independent elections.
Prediction Task Results. As we can see in Fig. 2, in all but one case our
model tends to do as well or better than the alternatives, which further validates
our model. The MRP Cross-Val method is the most competitive alternative.
However, the high performance of MRP Cross-Val is likely because the cross-
validation method is optimized for prediction, whereas our model and the other
alternatives are not.
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Fig. 2. Plot of the mean squared error of the actual and predicted vote share yielded
by various prediction methods. Error bars are standard error of the mean.
6 Application
The results of our method distinguish themselves from the baseline methods dis-
cussed in Sect. 5 because they not only shed light on voter preferences, but also
represent those preferences in the same latent policy space as known positions
of political candidates. We can leverage the latter capability to assess the de-
gree of political polarization in the electorate compared to candidates’ political
positions.
6.1 Background of Polarization
Previous Work. Popular media and political science communities have ob-
served that the American political elite is becoming increasingly polarized over
time, but much less work has drawn conclusions on mass polarization [24,29].
Some political scientists hypothesize that the distribution of the political prefer-
ences of the U.S. electorate is unimodal and moderate compared to that of the
political elite [14,13]. Yet other evidence suggests increasing polarization in the
American population [1]. The results of our method could add a valuable new
perspective since we draw on data sources separate from the survey methods
many of the opposing arguments used [1,13,14,19,21].
Among the related works that do not base their conclusions on survey data,
Fiorina and Abrams find that most observations of mass polarization trends, such
as differences in sociocultural attributes and world views, are not strong enough
to make definitive claims about overall trends of mass polarization [13]. Their
main critique of utilizing voting behavior as a proxy for political polarization
is that the past actions and political preferences of candidates are not factored
into the model. Our work addresses this by factoring in candidate CFscores in
addition to voter behavior. Further, most related works only use one numeric
metric, the difference of the means of subsets of the population, to measure mass
polarization [21]. However, DiMaggio, et al. define mass polarization in terms
of discrepancies between distributions, which can be described by more than a
single number [9]. Some have analyzed polarization in a more holistic way, but
their methods depend on survey data [19,21].
Defining Political Polarization. Mass political polarization refers to polar-
ization in the electorate, while elite polarization refers to polarization among
elected officials. One way to directly measure polarization in either case is to
fit a mixture of two Normal distributions to the distribution of preferences of
a population, then take the standardized difference of the component means of
that mixture. For this procedure to be interpretable, we assume each mixture
component has equal weight (0.5) and the same variance. We standardize the
absolute difference of the two means by dividing by the inferred standard devi-
ation of each component. This unique “difference-of-means” metric is intended
as a rough proxy for the probability mass missing from the center of a distribu-
tion of preferences. Related works often use a similar metric, but they compute
means by aggregating survey responses or other point estimates of subsets of the
population rather than fitting a mixture model to the population distribution.
We also measure political polarization in two ways previously used in the
political science literature: dispersion and bimodality [9]. Dispersion represents
the extent to which more varied opinions in the population increase the difficulty
for a “centrist political consensus” to exist in the population [9]. DiMaggio, et al.
suggest measuring dispersion with the standard deviation of the distribution of
political preferences. An increase in the standard deviation signifies that voters
have more extreme political preferences and less moderate preferences in the
middle of the distribution. Bimodality represents the level of separate opinions
of different groups that can lead to a higher chance of social conflict. Bimodality
can be measured with the kurtosis of the distribution. The formal definitions of
these quantities are given in the appendix in Sect. A.
6.2 Analyzing Polarization
We apply our results to the question of trends in mass polarization for Texas,
New York, and Ohio. We generate state-level distributions of voter preferences
similar to the method described in 5.1. The resulting inferred distributions are
shown in Fig. 3.
Mass versus Elite Polarization. Using the state-level estimates, we compute
the polarization metrics as described in Sect. 6.1 for the inferred voter distribu-
tions and the corresponding candidate distributions.
First, as seen in Fig. 3, the inferred distributions of voter preferences visually
appear unimodal, even though our model does not make this assumption at the
state level. This is supported quantitatively in Table 1, where the electorate has
relatively consistently smaller difference-of-means polarization metric than the
candidates. This suggests there is no mass polarization in terms of bimodality
within each state. Second, we find in Table 1 that the standard deviation of the
distribution of voter preferences is generally larger than that of the distribution
of candidates. This consistent difference in dispersion suggests that voters often
have more extreme preferences than the candidates running for office. Third, the
kurtosis of the distribution of voter preferences is generally larger than that of
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Fig. 3. Distributions of inferred voter preferences (represented by lines) and candi-
date preferences (histograms) based on data of the 2006, 2008 and 2010 congressional
elections in Texas, New York, and Ohio.
the distribution of candidate preferences. Larger values of kurtosis indicate lower
values of bimodality, so the consistent positive difference in kurtosis suggests
that the voter distributions are unimodal. The results on kurtosis corroborate
qualitative observation of our plots and the difference-of-means statistic.
Together these findings suggest that the distribution of political candidates
may not be representative of the distribution of preferences of the electorate in
the years and states we study because the extremes and the center of the voter
populations are underrepresented. Further, these findings also suggest that the
elites are more polarized than the electorate in terms of bimodality, but the
electorate is more polarized than the elites in terms of dispersion. Inferred dis-
tributions under alternative assumed numbers of cluster components and under
alternative mixture component distributions are shown in the appendix in Fig.
S1 and Fig. S4. These robustness checks further support our dispersion finding
but yield somewhat more mixed results on bimodality.
7 Discussion
Our methods have some limitations that could be addressed in future work.
Firstly, biases inherent in our model could undermine our qualitative conclu-
sions about polarization. Because the tails of the component distributions in our
model are nearly non-identifiable, the posterior distributions in our model end
Table 1. Polarization metrics of the voters given inferred voter preferences and of the
candidates based on Bonica’s CFscores [8]. The “difference” of each polarization metric
row is the difference between the voter metric and the candidate metric.
2006 2008 2010
TX NY OH TX NY OH TX NY OH
Difference- Voters 0.02 0.19 5.25 0.18 0.16 12.60 0.27 0.03 0.86
of-Means Cand. 2.00 1.33 2.11 0.36 0.62 1.88 0.13 1.96 2.16
Diff -1.98 -1.14 3.14 -0.17 -0.46 10.73 0.14 -1.94 -1.30
Standard Voters 4.36 39.54 68.20 2.14 78.46 74.23 3.88 39.30 2.75
Deviation Cand. 0.97 0.77 1.22 1.07 0.83 0.99 1.22 0.81 1.07
Diff 3.38 38.77 66.97 1.07 77.64 73.24 2.66 38.49 1.68
Voters 3.04 20.87 2.78 1.47 19.54 0.56 0.85 16.15 0.22
Kurtosis Cand. -1.62 1.67 1.23 0.49 1.79 -1.77 3.24 -1.61 -1.73
Diff 4.66 19.20 1.55 0.97 17.75 2.33 -2.39 17.76 1.95
up placing a large mass on preference distributions with high variances. The
inference procedure could be improved to yield more reliable estimates. Simi-
larly, our inference procedure assumes unimodal component distributions, which
could bias the aggregate state level output towards unimodal distributions. As
a result, we may infer high-variance unimodal precinct distributions because of
the biases in the component distributions. To address these concerns, we test the
ability of our procedure to recover bimodal distributions at the state level with
synthetic precinct-level data. We explicitly define bimodal precinct distributions
in the synthetic data, and our inference procedure was still able to correctly
recover bimodal district and state-level distributions under the assumption of
unimodal component distributions. This indicates that our model is able to rep-
resent and recover bimodal preference distributions even if the model is making
an incorrect assumption that individual precincts are unimodal. This result on
synthetic data lends some confidence that our application results on real data
are not artefactual. However, our inferences on real data still have some quirks.
For example, the inferred distribution of the Ohio election in 2008 is implausibly
wide. In explorations of ways to address this issue, we found that adding an
informative prior on the variance helped to an extent.
Another limitation of our method is that we assume the observed vote shares
of elections is tied to the underlying preference distributions. This allows the
model to aggregate ideological preferences of individual voters within precincts.
However, some political scientists believe voters tend to vote for candidates ac-
cording to party affiliation rather than ideology [6]. While this is a large limi-
tation to our approach, future work could extend our model by estimating the
extent to which people vote along party lines as opposed to according to pol-
icy preferences. As it stands, the distributions of preferences we infer can be
interpreted as the distributions of expressed preferences of voters, if not the
distribution of actual preferences.
Finally, a more fundamental limitation is that we cannot validate the shape of
the inferred precinct distributions with existing survey data, since we only have
observations at the district level. Future work could create a test set through
an in-depth survey of the distributions of preferences of particular precincts.
Validating the distributions we infer is critical to bringing our work to a level
that would be useful to practitioners. At the moment we cannot tell to what
extent the shape of the individual precinct distributions we infer is determined
by the data versus biases from our model.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we present a model to address the problem of understanding public
opinion in the context of voter preferences and political polarization. Our model
builds on a long literature of spatial voting models. We use mixtures of spatial
voting models to infer clusters of U.S. precincts that display similar voting pat-
terns. Our model simultaneously infers preference distributions associated with
those clusters utilizing data not only about voters, but also of candidates. These
features allow us to analyze the distributions of voter preferences on their own
and relative to distributions of candidate preferences. We infer voter preferences
given precinct-level election results of three election cycles and three different
states. We validate our inferences to the extent that we can using existing data.
We validate against alternative measures of public opinion, as well as by com-
paring the predictive power of our model and alternative methods.
One extension of this work could adapt the model to account for elections
with an uncontested candidate using similar ideas tried by Levendusky, et al.
[20]. Our model could also be updated to include an offset accounting for the
number of political parties in the election, which can address the bias of results
based on a two-party system. Another direction is to explore other applications
of our inference methods in the field of political science. For example, inferred
precinct-level preference distributions could predict the effects of congressional
redistricting, the process of assigning geographic boundary lines to congressional
districts. Precincts are the building blocks for districts, so we could use precinct
preference estimates of our model to predict the effects of redistricting proposals
on the makeup of Congress.
Variations of our model could be applied more broadly beyond the scope of
political science to understand distributions of preferences on other topics. For
example, surveys are also used to understand consumer preferences on certain
consumer products. A variation of our model could avoid the need for surveys
or supplement surveys in this and other areas.
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A Mathematical Definitions of DiMaggio’s Polarization
Metrics
Given the estimates of our model, we use the following analytical form of the
standard deviation of a mixture model to measure political polarization in terms
of dispersion:
Mσ =
√√√√( K∑
i=1
ni∑K
j=1 nj
(µi2 + σi2)
)
−Mµ (4)
where ni is the total number of voters assigned to component i and Mµ is the
weighted mean of the mixture distribution of voter preferences.
To measure political polarization in terms of bimodality, we use kurtosis.
Kurtosis is the fourth central moment of the mixture distribution divided by
the square of the variance of the mixture distribution. We use the following
analytical form:
Mk =
E[(X −Mµ)]4
M4σ
(5)
where X is a random variable drawn from the mixture distribution and hence
the numerator is the fourth central moment of the mixture distribution. The
analytical form to compute the z-th central moment of the mixture distribution
is below.
E[(X −Mµ)z] =
K∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)
(µi −Mµ)z−jwiE[(Yi − µi)z] (6)
where Yi is a random variable drawn from component i of the mixture distribu-
tion, wi is the weight of each component, and E[(Yi − µi)z] is the z-th central
moment of the ith component distribution. In our analysis, we weight each com-
ponent in the mixture distribution by the proportion of the population assigned
that component.
B Additional Results
In Sect. 5, we presented the results of our method assuming the underlying
component distribution is Normal and the number of clusters (K) is 4. This
section tests the robustness of these assumptions and presents our results when
varying the underlying component distribution and the number of clusters.
B.1 Varying the Underlying Component Distribution
We test the inference procedure of our model not only assuming Normal com-
ponent distributions, but also Uniform and Laplace component distributions.
When assuming the distributions of voters follow a Laplace distribution, we use
the same Normal prior defined for the mean of the Normal component for the
location parameter and the same Inverse Gamma prior defined for the stan-
dard deviation of the Normal component for the scale parameter. When we use
Uniform component distributions, we use the same Normal prior defined for the
mean of the Normal component for both the minimum and the distance between
the minimum and maximum parameters. The priors defined for the Normal com-
ponent parameters can be found in Sect. 4. For each alternative underlying com-
ponent distribution, the inferred distributions can be seen in Fig. S1, derived
polarization metrics can be seen in Table S1, and prediction comparisons can be
seen in Fig. S3.
Figure S2 visualizes the comparisons between the results derived of alter-
native component distributions and alternative data sources described in Sect.
5.1. We find significant positive correlations between our district-level point es-
timates and all of the alternative data sources. Assuming Laplace component
distributions, our results have a correlation of 0.3216 with the responses select-
ing ideology given a discrete scale (left column in Fig. S2), 0.2514 with the re-
sponses selecting ideology along a continuous scale (middle column), and 0.5323
with the MRP estimates (right column). All of these correlations were significant
with p-values less than 0.01. Assuming Uniform component distributions, our re-
sults have a correlation of 0.3652 with the responses selecting ideology given a
discrete scale, 0.2404 with the responses selecting ideology along a continuous
scale, and 0.6331 with the MRP estimates. Again, all of these correlations were
significant with p-values less than 0.01.
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Fig. S1. Distributions of inferred voter preferences (represented by lines) under alterna-
tive assumed mixture component distributions, and candidate preferences (histograms)
based on data of the 2006, 2008 and 2010 congressional elections in Texas, New York,
and Ohio.
Table S1. Polarization metrics computed similarly to Tab. 1 of voters and candidates
assuming different underlying component distributions.
2006 2008 2010
TX NY OH TX NY OH TX NY OH
U
n
if
o
rm
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n Difference- Voters 0.02 5.73 -0.26 0.47 6.69 3.27 0.26 3.01 0.02
of-Means Cand. 1.99 0.62 1.08 1.40 1.52 1.85 0.60 1.65 2.09
Diff -1.97 5.11 -0.25 -0.93 5.17 1.42 -0.34 1.37 -2.06
Standard Voters 2.11 27.51 24.55 1.94 86.17 27.71 3.42 21.46 5.12
Deviation Cand. 0.97 0.77 1.22 1.07 0.83 0.99 1.22 0.81 1.07
Diff 1.13 26.73 23.33 0.87 85.34 26.72 2.20 20.65 4.05
Voters -0.77 42.17 -2.96 0.72 42.50 -2.99 0.38 39.39 -3.00
Kurtosis Cand. -1.62 1.67 1.23 0.49 1.79 -1.77 3.24 -1.61 -1.73
Diff 0.85 40.50 -4.19 0.23 40.71 -1.23 -2.86 41.00 -1.27
L
a
p
la
c
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
Difference- Voters 1.76 5.13 6.01 1.47 3.21 4.07 5.60 4.17 0.56
of-Means Cand. 1.80 0.41 1.84 1.73 1.15 2.00 1.79 1.64 2.06
Diff -0.04 4.72 4.17 -0.26 2.07 2.07 3.81 2.54 -1.50
Standard Voters 19.25 61.64 14.51 10.64 86.42 26.79 193.24 53.56 1.67
Deviation Cand. 0.97 0.77 1.22 1.07 0.83 0.99 1.22 0.81 1.07
Diff 18.28 60.87 13.29 9.57 85.60 25.80 192.03 52.74 0.60
Voters -2.99 1.78 1.84 -2.48 1.49 2.34 -2.90 1.47 -1.42
Kurtosis Cand. -1.62 1.67 1.23 0.49 1.79 -1.77 3.24 -1.61 -1.73
Diff -1.37 0.11 0.61 -2.97 -0.30 4.10 -6.14 3.08 0.30
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Fig. S2. In all of these cases, the inferred district-level voter preferences are based
on the model varying its assumption of the underlying precinct distribution and are
weighted mean district estimates transformed from x to sign(x) log(|x| + 1). (Left)
Inferences compared with CCES question of self-reported ideologies on a discrete scale.
(Center) Compared with the CCES self-reported ideologies on a continuous scale from 0
to 100. (Right) District-level inferences of a full decade compared with MRP estimates
[27].
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Fig. S3. Mean squared error of the actual and predicted vote share yielded by various
prediction methods. Inferred data prediction method is based on our model assuming
alternative underlying component distributions.
B.2 Varying the Number of Clusters
We also varied the number of clusters (K) used in the model. The main results
section in the paper presented results assuming K = 4, but below we include
the inferred distributions in Fig. S4, derived polarization metrics in Table S2,
and prediction comparisons in Fig. S6 for K = 2 and K = 8, assuming Normal
underlying precinct distributions. Due to time constraints, we were only able to
generate these results given the Texas and New York congressional elections.
Figure S5 visualizes the comparisons between the results derived of alter-
native component distributions and alternative data sources described in Sec.
5.1. We find significant positive correlations between our district-level point es-
timates and all of the alternative data sources. When our model assumes 2
clusters rather than 4 clusters, the results of our model have a correlation of
0.2845 with the responses selecting ideology given a discrete scale (left column
in Fig. S2), 0.2646 with the responses selecting ideology along a continuous scale
(middle column), and 0.7160 with the MRP estimates (right column). All of
these correlations were significant with p-values less than 0.01. When our model
assumes 8 clusters, the results of our model have a correlation of 0.2925 with
the responses selecting ideology given a discrete scale, 0.1867 with the responses
selecting ideology along a continuous scale, and 0.6861 with the MRP estimates
(right column). Again, all of these correlations were significant with p-values less
than 0.01.
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Fig. S4. Distributions of inferred voter preferences (represented by lines) under alterna-
tive assumed mixture component distributions, and candidate preferences (histograms)
based on data of the 2006, 2008 and 2010 congressional elections in Texas (dotted line)
and New York (solid line).
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Fig. S5. In all of these cases, the inferred district-level voter preferences are based
on the model varying its assumption of K and are weighted mean district estimates
transformed from x to sign(x) log(|x| + 1). (Left) Inferences compared with CCES
question of self-reported ideologies on a discrete scale. (Center) Compared with the
CCES self-reported ideologies on a continuous scale from 0 to 100. (Right) District-
level inferences of a full decade compared with MRP estimates [27].
Table S2. Polarization metrics of the voters given inferences assuming different num-
bers of clusters (K) and of the candidate CFscores (cand.) [8]. The “diff” of each
polarization metric is the difference between the voter and candidate metric.
2006 2008 2010
TX NY TX NY TX NY
K
=
2
Difference- Voters 0.86 2.53 0.75 2.05 1.58 1.54
of-Means Cand. 1.87 1.58 1.83 0.37 0.41 1.433
Diff -1.01 0.95 -1.08 1.68 1.17 0.11
Standard Voters 2.40 7.75 2.36 188.98 2.15 4.56
Deviation Cand. 0.97 0.77 1.07 0.83 1.22 0.81
Diff 1.42 6.98 1.28 188.15 0.94 3.74
Voters 0.49 3.13 0.27 4.07 -0.15 3.24
Kurtosis Cand. -1.62 1.67 0.49 1.79 3.24 -1.61
Diff 2.11 1.46 -0.23 2.27 -3.39 4.84
K
=
8
Difference- Voters 9.06 9.30 3.39 6.80 1.80 1.81
of-Means Cand. 1.74 0.54 1.82 1.55 2.17 1.42
Diff 7.32 8.76 1.56 5.25 -0.37 0.39
Standard Voters 110.59 60.49 38.55 85.00 5.59 55.75
Deviation Cand. 0.97 0.77 1.07 0.83 1.22 0.81
Diff 109.61 59.72 37.48 84.17 4.37 54.94
Voters 5.64 2.65 48.57 4.06 -0.03 0.50
Kurtosis Cand. -1.62 1.67 0.49 1.79 3.24 -1.61
Diff 7.26 0.98 48.07 2.26 -3.27 2.11
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Fig. S6. Mean squared error of the actual and predicted vote share yielded by various
prediction methods. Inferred data prediction method is based on our model assuming
different numbers of clusters (K).
